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Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
Agenda
• What is S&MA?
• System Safety
• Reliability and Maintainability
• Quality Engineering
• Software Assurance
• Operational Safety
• Aviation Safety
• How does S&MA fit into Programs/Projects?
• Program/Project S&MA in the “Real World”
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S&MA is… Program/Project Management! 
S&MA is… Systems Engineering!
S&MA is… Real Engineering!
S&MA is… a framework of methodologies, analyzes, tools, and processes:
• For the meaningful organization of complex data and information
• For the successful execution of critical tasks
• And ultimately for the proactive management of risks and margins to 
achieve desired results.
S&MA, Six Primary disciplines:
• System Safety
• Reliability and Maintainability
• Quality Engineering
• Software Assurance
• Operational Safety
• Aviation Safety
What is S&MA?
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S&MA:
Works when you want it to,
Doesn’t work when you don’t want it to,
Provides capability in a contingency
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System Safety engineering specifically addresses the identification, analysis, 
and control of system risks to humans, the environment, and mission assets.
The System Safety assessment includes numerous forms of high-level analyses 
performed to support safety decisions such as: 
• Hazard Analysis 
• Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
• System Safety Performance Analysis 
• Phenomenological Analysis 
What is System Safety?
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What is System Safety?
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Through design evaluation, probabilistic modeling and analysis, and testing, 
the Reliability and Maintainability disciplines help establish the necessary 
confidence that the system and its components will function as required.
This discipline is split into two parts:
1. Reliability Engineering: assessment and improvement of reliability 
performance of systems during their missions.
2. Maintainability Engineering: assessments and verification of the system 
design characteristics so that downtime and the need for maintenance are 
minimized. 
What is Reliability and 
Maintainability?
8
Reliability: The system performs as intended when needed
Maintainability: How fast, easy, and safe it is to
repair the system when necessary
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What is Reliability and 
Maintainability?
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Quality Engineering includes the design, compliance, and fitness for use of its products and 
services. As part of the overall Quality Assurance effort, it serves to provide confidence that 
product configurations meet safety and technical requirements. Quality Engineering forms an 
essential part of the overall plan to achieving safe and successful missions consistently and 
continuously.
Achieving Quality Engineering requires:
• Establishing needs and expectations
• Developing an effective quality management process
• Establishing engineering and manufacturing practices that emphasize robust design, the 
state where the technology, product, or process performance is minimally sensitive to 
factors causing variability
• Identifying critical processes, processes that, if performed incorrectly or in violation of 
prescribed requirements, could result in loss of life, serious personal injury, loss of mission, 
or loss of a significant mission resource
• Identifying key characteristics, the features of a material, process, or part whose variation 
has a significant influence on product fit, performance, service life, or manufacturability
• Verifying that the product, as built, meets the design
• Developing process maturity through continuous process improvement efforts 
What is Quality Engineering?
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Example: Tile Repair, “Bubbles in the Goo”
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What is Quality Engineering?
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The Software Assurance discipline operates under the scrutiny of a planned and systematic set 
of activities that ensure that the software and its related products:
• Conform to software life cycle processes
• Meet their specified requirements and standards
• Are consistent, complete, correct, and safe
• Are secure and reliable as warranted for the system and operating environment
• Satisfy customer needs
• Are implemented according to plan
In order to achieve these goals, the Software Assurance discipline consists of five distinct roles:
• Software Quality: assurance that quality is built into the software
• Software Safety: an approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling software hazards
• Software Reliability: an approach to incorporating and measuring reliability throughout the 
product lifecycle by building in software error prevention, fault detection, isolation, recovery, 
and/or reduced functionality states
• Software Verification & Validation (V&V): activities which ensure that software satisfies 
functional requirements and that each phase of the development process yields acceptable 
products
• Independent Verification & Validation (V&V): additional V&V activities performed by an 
independent organization 
What is Software Assurance?
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Software has become an increasingly more significant, more 
complex, and more critical part of integrated space systems… 
and therefore software assurance has also grown significantly! 
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What is Operational Safety?
Managing risks and preventing operational accidents is imperative for SMA’s 
Operational Safety workforce. This NASA SMA function focuses on the 
prevention of operations-related safety hazards by: 
• Assuring mission success
• Protecting the public and flight, ground, laboratory, and underwater personnel
• Protecting the environment
• Protecting the aircraft, spacecraft, and payloads
• Protecting the facilities, property, and equipment
The governing policy directive for this discipline is the NASA General Safety 
Program Requirements (NPD 8715.3) Chapter 3 which specifically focuses on 
the following key aspects: Motor Vehicle Safety; Personal Protective 
Equipment; Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout Program); Pressure 
System Safety; Electrical Safety; Hazardous Material Transportation, Storage, 
and Use; Hazardous Operations; Laboratory Hazards; Lifting Safety; Explosive, 
Propellant, and Pyrotechnic Safety; Underwater Operations Safety; Launch, 
Entry, and Experimental Aeronautical Vehicle Operations Safety; Test 
Operations Safety; Non-Ionizing Radiation; Ionizing Radiation; and, Confined 
Spaces.
Additionally, there are many Federal, State, and Local laws that also apply to 
Operational Safety at NASA. 
19
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What is Aviation Safety?
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• Indentify, Analyze, Eliminate, and 
Report Hazards
• Risk Assessment / Risk Management
• Fault Tree Analysis
• FMEA/CIL & FMECA
…assure mission success and preserve human and material resources
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Six primary S&MA disciplines:
• System Safety
• Reliability and Maintainability
• Quality Engineering
• Software Assurance
• Operational Safety
• Aviation Safety
What is S&MA?
An Integrated Discipline!
23
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What is S&MA?
The “Psychology” Side of S&MA
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What is S&MA?
The “Softer/People” Side of S&MA
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Bryan O’Connor’s Characteristics of a Great 
S&MA Professional:
• Technically Credible 
• Imbued with “Engineering Curiosity” 
• Courageous (“truth to power”)
• High Integrity
• Solid Knowledge of Requirements and Rationale
• Good Communication Skills (Verbal & Written)
• Experience in Applicable Field
• Humble Yet Engaged
• Persistent Yet Pragmatic
• Energetic and Creative (Yes, if….)
• Thick Skin and Sense of Humor (for Longevity)
Bryan O’Connor
Agency Chief, S&MA 
“We’re just flat not as smart as we think we are”
Tommy Holloway
Space Shuttle Program Manager
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“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest 
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. 
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges 
and parties at the same time;”
The Federalist No. 10
(a series arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution)
James Madison
November 23, 1787
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“Trust, but verify”
Adopted and made famous by U.S. president Ronald Reagan. Reagan frequently used it 
when discussing U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Reagan rightly presented it as a 
translation of the Russian proverb "doveryai, no proveryai" (Russian: Доверяй, но 
проверяй). Soviet revolutionary Vladmir Lenin also frequently used the phrase. Reagan 
used the phrase at the signing of the INF Treaty, his counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev 
responded: "You repeat that at every meeting," to which Reagan answered "I like it.“
Birth and Sustainment
Of US “Assurance”?
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Program/Project S&MA Interfaces
Organizations and People, “Governance”
NPD 1000.0, NASA Governance and Strategic Management Handbook
S&MA Throughout the Program Lifecycle
Modeled after NPR7120.5
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NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements
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Figure 1 - Agency Requirements Framework Related to Human-Rating
Program/Project S&MA Interfaces
S&MA Content Example: NPR8705.2b
NPR 8705.2B Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems 
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Figure 2 - Relationship Among Requirements
Program/Project S&MA Interfaces
S&MA Content Example: NPR8705.2b
NPR 8705.2B Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems 
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Figure 3 - Human-Rating Certification Process Flow
* Note: The human-rating is also reviewed as a part of each subsequent Readiness Review
Program/Project S&MA Interfaces
S&MA Content Example: NPR8705.2b
NPR 8705.2B Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems 
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U.S. combatants in the battle of Iwo Jima 1945 1/10*
Doolittle raid1942, and Pickett’s charge 1864 1/11*
U.S. combatants on D-Day 1/29*
New York City firefighter on 9/11 1/34*
B-17 single mission over Germany 1943 1/37**
Mt Everest climb (1922 – 2006) 1/49*
Soyuz missions (manned flight statistics 1967 – present) 1/52**
Space Shuttle mission (statistics 1981-present) 1/66**
Space shuttle mission to/fm ISS (2010 PRA) 1/89**
Cx and CCT agency threshold (single ISS mission) 1/150**
X-15 research flight 1/199**
Cx and CCT design requirement (single ISS mission) 1/270**
Alaskan crab fisherman (one year) 1/281*
U.S. crop duster pilot (one year) 1/510**
Cx and CCT recommended goal (single ISS mission) 1/750**
U.S. logging, timber cutting (one year) 1/775*
U.S. construction worker (one year) 1/2440*
U.S. coal miner  (one year) 1/3450*
*  deaths/total participants
** fatal mishaps/total missions
Interesting Relative Risks
Example: Agency Loss Of Crew (LOC)
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Safety Enhancements Throughout Lifecycle
Example: Shuttle Program, fixes & improvements
!
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Program / Project
S&MA
S&MA
Program / Project
Program / Project
S&MA
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• Independent, yet engaged/informed
• Relevant conscious of Program/Project
• Value needed and proactive value added
• Healthy tension and checks & balances
• Independent, but informed?
• Conscious of Program/Project, relevant?
• Value needed? Value added?
• Checks & balances, but the right areas?
• Not Independent
• Conscious of Program/Project?
• Value “as directed”
• Healthy tension? Checks & balances?
S&MA as a Function of Organization
Program/Project S&MA Relationship (“tightly coupled”)
JSC S&MA
JSC S&MA
JSC S&MA
3 Jobs of S&MA: Doing… Checking… Technical Authority
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Figure 5.1 The NASA Program Life Cycle
S&MA as a Function of Engagement Timing
Engagement Example: NPR7123.1 
S&MA Breadth of Initial/Significant Engagement
- Tailoring reqs and processes - Compliance to what's on the books
- Informing risk trades - Auditing “water under the bridge”
- Proper scoping - Reactionary resourcing
NPR 7123.1, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements
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S&MA as a Function of Resources
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Note: Erosion due to lack of resources starts on THIS END
of the spectrum and moves toward “reactive compliance” 
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Program/Project S&MA scope?
• Large? Small?
• Complex? Simple?
• Critical functions?
• Critical hazards?
• Make vs. buy? “in-line”?
• Insight/oversight model?
• “Human” spaceflight?
• Who is accountable?
• Multiple NASA centers?
• Multiple contractors?
• International Partners?
• TRL level? objectives?
• Acquisition phase/maturity?
(SRR? PDR? CDR? Ops?)
So, how much should S&MA “cost”?
How much should be “invested” in S&MA?
Program
Project
Example
2
Program
Project
Example
3
Program
Project
Example
4
Program
Project
Example
1
S&MA 
“investment”5%
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15%
100%
Typical Range
(very rough rule of thumb)
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Core tenets:
• S&MA is an “investment”, not a 
“cost.”  S&MA enables safety 
and mission success… and 
actually saves money!
• S&MA is an Agency, Program, 
Project, or Center risk mitigation 
strategy against safety, mission 
success, schedule and cost (cost 
of quality) threats
Examples:
• SSP = ~ 5%, with caveats!
• ISS = ~4%, with caveats!
• Small/Simple GFE =~5-7%
• Large/Complex GFE =~12-15%
NOTE:
• lots of Program/Project specific context 
to consider!
Notionally represents one comparative snapshot in time, changes over lifecycle!
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Demonstrated Value of “Assurance”
Historical Example
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Historical Account of “Human Rating”
We’ve Gotten There Multiple Ways
B Wood ‘10
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NASA Technical Requirements
NASA Management Oversight
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S&MA’s Challenges
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High Reliability Organizations
Challenges at NASA
• Advanced Technology
• Advanced, leading edge technology, difficult to intellectually manage
• Allowable Failure Rate
• Fewest number of failures allowed to be considered successful
• High Visibility
• Intense media coverage, public interest
• Organizational Complexity / Size / Diversity
• Highest number of decisions and people involved per event
• Research and Development
• Don’t always have answers; Independent Safety
*excerpt from presentation on “High Reliability Organizations” 
Core
Values &
Principals
Scenario,
Event,
Decision
Requirements,
Verification/Validation
Processes,
Standards,
Policies,
History &Lessons,
Culture, etc.
Seek
Guidance
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Mission Directorate: Exploration Systems
Theme: Commercial Spaceflight
Program: Commercial Crew Program Overview 
The Commercial Crew Program will provide $6 billion over the next five years to support the development of commercial crew 
transportation providers to whom NASA could competitively award a crew transportation services contract analogous to the Cargo 
Resupply Services contract for ISS.
These funds will be competed through COTS-like, fixed-price, milestone-based Space Act Agreements that support the 
development, testing, and demonstration of multiple commercial crew systems. As with the COTS cargo program, some amount of 
private investment capital will be included as part of any Space Act Agreement and NASA will use this funding to support a range of 
higher- and lower-programmatic risk systems. Unlike the COTS program, which exclusively funded entirely new and integrated 
systems (launch vehicles plus capsules), this program will also be open to a broad range of commercial proposals including, but not 
limited to: human-rating existing launch vehicles, developing spacecraft for delivering crew to the ISS that can be launched on 
multiple launch vehicles, or developing new high-reliability rocket systems. 
NASA will leverage existing COTS and Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) activities to engage a broad spectrum of private 
industry, from emerging to established companies, with a full and open competition for commercial development activities at the 
conclusion of the CCDev activities. The competition will result in a targeted portfolio of up to four companies with a mixed risk 
balance consisting of launch vehicles, crew capsules, and supporting technologies, similar to the Commercial Crew Development 
awards from Recovery Act funds announced on February 2, 2010. The number of awardees will be based on such factors as 
technical competency and available funds. Firm-fixed-price awards will be issued for production of crew services after a key 
progress review of the down-selected commercial companies as necessary, within the available budget. 
At no point in the development and acquisition of commercial crew transportation services will NASA compromise crew safety. 
NASA has unique expertise and history in this area, and a clearly demonstrated record of success. NASA will bring that experience 
to bear in the appropriate way to make sure that commercial crew transportation services are a success both programmatically, and 
with respect to safety. In that regard, NASA agrees with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, which stated, “it is crucial that NASA 
focus on establishing the certification requirements, a certification process for orbital transportation vehicles, and a process for 
validating compliance. The performance and safety requirements must be stated promptly and clearly to enable NASA and non-
NASA entities to proceed in the most productive and effective manner possible.” NASA will work to complete an agency and 
industry-coordinated human rating draft by the end of 2010. 
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/428356main_Exploration.pdf
Modern-Day Guidance For “Transportation”
Do We Set Ourselves Up For “Failure”?
“Failure” meaning:
performance  = expectations
?!?
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“To your own discretion therefore must be left the degree of danger you 
risk, and the point at which you should decline, only saying we wish you 
to err on the side of your safety, and to bring back your party safe even if 
it be with less information.”
Thomas Jefferson Letter to Meriwether Lewis: 1803
Historic Guidance For “High Risk Exploration”
Today: Are We Too Risk Averse To “Explore” More Cheaply?
Are We Too Cheap To Buy The Risk Posture We Say We Want?
During the "Heroic Age of Exploration," the 
period in which Shackleton's 1914-1916 
British Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition 
took place, Antarctic expeditions often 
became ordeals of suffering. At the time, 
polar explorers were revered for their 
sacrifices and held up as heroes, albeit 
often tragic ones. Shackleton handpicked 
some members, to recruit the rest, it is said 
that he posted the following notice: 
Or, is there some new (elusive) way to achieve better S&MA for less $?
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Thank you,
Onward and Upward!
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